I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will discuss the relationship between civil/political and economic/social/cultural rights (as they are defined in the International Bill of Human Rights 3) in sub-Saharan Africa. There is an on-going debate, especially in United Nations circles and in non-governmental organizations, ties are allowed. A rather narrow functionalist perspective is adopted; economic development is taken as a goal, and civil and political rights are discussed as means which might or might not result in economic development. Civil/political rights are seldom considered as goals in and of themselves, although social and cultural rights are considered as goals, especially in Africa. In this paper, I will discuss civil/political rights both as means to ends and as goals in themselves, arguing specifically three points:
1. That civil and political rights are needed in order to implement reasonable development policies and to ensure equitable distribution of wealth, as well as economic growth. 2. That civil and political rights are needed in order to guarantee social and cultural rights (and the maintenance of a stable social order which is necessary for society itself to exist). 3. That civil and political rights are needed in and of themselves; that is, that even at the lowest levels of economic development, some people need and want individual freedom.
In making this argument I recognize that I am in fact addressing only one side of the larger international debate. I am not arguing that civil and political rights must take priority over economic, social, and cultural rights; the two sets of rights are interactive, not sequential. I agree with Shue's position that economic subsistence ought to be a basic right.10 Within Africa, however, the right to subsistence is now taken for granted (theoretically) whereas rights to physical security and those civil and political freedoms which are necessary for effective political participation are problematic. Often, the position that subsistence rights must take priority over civil/ political rights is taken solely for rhetorical purposes to perpetuate the political monopoly of a self-serving elite. Against such an elite, one needs to consider the meaning of civil and political freedoms for the poor and unfree masses.
Au fond, the debate over priorities or non-priorities of civil/political vs. economic human rights is a debate about human nature. The "full-belly" thesis is that a man's belly must be full before he can indulge in the "luxury" of worrying about his political freedoms. Yet there is an alternate view that human dignity, or perhaps "self-respect,"" is a fundamental requirement of human nature. In an earlier paper I argued that "[a]ll human beings need a certain sense of dignity or autonomy. To achieve such dignity, each individual needs a certain amount of order, physical security, and personal freedom."12 In this paper, I will enlarge on this initial proposition about human 
II. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE NECESSARY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
According to Meltzer, there are two competing paradigms of how civil/ political rights and economic development interact in the Third World:
Development requires significant economic growth and social stability. Such growth and stability often require limiting civil and political rights. Therefore, development often requires the limitation of civil liberties and political participation to succeed. or Development requires active participation of people and the fulfillment of basic economic and social needs to be effective. Deprivation of civil and political rights and human needs destroys that possibility. Therefore, failure to provide for human rights and basic needs makes development impossible.13 Which paradigm one considers correct depends to a large extent on one's definition of the term "development." Most serious discussions of development in Africa refer to some combination of absolute growth, redistribution of wealth in a more egalitarian manner, and increased national autonomy or self-sufficiency, as for example in the rhetoric of "African socialism" in Kenya,14 of "ujamaa" in Tanzania,1s and of "humanism" in Zambia.'6 For such development, civil and political liberties are necessary both to ensure that proper development policies are implemented and inappropriate policies changed, and to ensure that wealth is distributed equitably among all a country's citizens. Such civil and political rights are necessary to ensure that political participation is effective as well as active; that is, that ordinary people's wishes are communicated to political leaders and that they actually affect policy. As Hayward remarks:
Participation of this sort-participation which is designed to be instrumental -is seldom tried. .... This is because of failures at various leadership levels or, more According to the first paradigm quoted above, economic stability requires cessation of civil and political freedoms. There is some truth to the argument that African nation-states are very fragile, and that ethnic, linguistic, or regional particularisms might threaten their political existence,'8 hence also their economic integrity. A country might become so involved in political competition that nothing else gets done; suppose, for example, that the Nigerian Electoral Commission had not reduced that country's original nineteen political parties to five national parties in 1979.'9 But in subSaharan English-speaking Africa the problem is not too much political freedom; rather, it is that, with the present exception of Nigeria, there is so little political freedom that economic development policies must evolve in an intellectual vacuum; a vacuum, moreover, that ensures the continued privilege of the ruling elite.
There is no known successful model of economic development which can be applied without substantial modification to sub-Saharan Africa. African states cannot imitate the development history of the Western world, with its empires and col6nies. Nor do African states have the centralized bureaucracies and nationalist sentiments which aided Russia and China. Small, ethnically diverse states with mixed economies, such as Yugoslavia, are probably the closest models which African countries could follow. But no model is perfect. Comprehensive economic policy-making, therefore, requires flexibility and freedom of debate, as well as a real understanding of African complexities, rather than ideological myths whether of right or left. Yet in Africa, economic policies are often made by executive fiat, with no room for debate; such decisions often result in dramatic swings in policies when failures must finally be rectified, or in interference by multilateral lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (resulting, for example, in political conflict over the price of rice in Sierra Leone in 1981 20 after the IMF urged that food subsidies be removed). Nowhere are the effects of poor planning more tragic than in food production and distribution.
Tanzania, for example, is now an importer of maize, in which it was formerly self-sufficient. One reason for its deficiency may be that until recently the government paid so little for maize that producers were encouraged to sell in the black market.21 Moreover, in pursuit of the socialist egalitarianism of ujamaa, Nyerere's government expropriated thirty-five large-scale African farmers producing about thirty percent of the country's marketed maize supply in the early 1970s.22 Most tragic of all, the forced "villagization" policy of 1973-75, which affected about two million people, resulted in a severe drop in maize production, as hostile, suspicious peasants refused to plant in their new homesteads. The results to the national economy were devastating, as massive amounts of foreign exchange had to be diverted from importation of other necessary items-such as industrial components-to food.23 By disallowing debate about ujamaa,24 Nyerere does not permit rational consideration of the possible negative economic effects of his policies.
In Ghana, cocoa production has significantly declined because of the government's underpayment of producers through its state monopoly Cocoa Marketing Board. While the cities are crowded with unemployed youths, the cocoa farms lack labor.25 Even basic food production is suffering. In the mid-1970s, the government of Colonel Acheampong launched an "Operation Feed Yourself" program to try to return to food self-sufficiency. Under this program, heavy agricultural machinery was imported, yet there was so severe a shortage of cutlasses, the basic low-technology agricultural implement, that they were being distributed personally by Regional Commissioners (state governors). By 1978, seventy percent of Ashanti farmers in one survey said they did not grow enough food to feed their families. The point here is not to argue that nationalizations, especially of largescale foreign-owned enterprise, are necessarily unwise economic policies for sub-Saharan African states. The point, rather, is that both comparative literature and the historical experience of Africa teaches us that continued input by those affected is necessary to ensure that economic policies are effective. Strong central control of the economy may well be necessary in poor countries which are striving for rapid development within an inequitable world economy. But such strength is not contingent upon inflexibility. Rather, it is contingent upon a willingness and ability to make constant adjustments in policy, and to respond to unexpected difficulties which emerge. Input from the base, in a system of political participation in which genuine free discussion is permitted, is necessary so that economic planners can make such adjustments. Civil and political freedoms of association, speech, and press are necessary to permit such input. "A favorable environment for civil and political rights can serve to reinforce public policies 29 In this context, then (assuming, for the sake of argument, that good faith is intended in planning), I suggest that the costs of not allowing civil/political freedoms of effective participation will far exceed the costs of allowing them. Surely it is more economically rational to allow peasants to lobby for increased prices for their cocoa or maize than to force them onto the black market or into smuggling. In the long run, the costs of such major blunders as food underproduction are extremely high in both economic and political terms. When peasants and workers find all avenues of political participation and criticism blocked, they can easily fall prey to populist demagoguery. In any case, historically speaking, the assumption that civil and political rights emerged only after "basic human needs," or economic rights, had already been fulfilled in the Western world is erroneous. In a brilliant article discussing violations of human rights in nineteenth-century Europe, Goldstein shows that major political battles between the proletariat and the ruling elite occurred over the right to suffrage, the right to freedom of the press and speech, and the right to freedom of association. In 1900, the literacy rate in Britain, one of the less repressive European countries, was ninety percent, but male life expectancy was a mere forty-eight years and the infant mortality rate was one hundred thirty per thousand; both these latter figures resemble figures in sub-Saharan Africa today. Goldstein concludes that in Europe the development effort, they only consider them irrelevant when they are absent. That actual exercise of such freedoms is not irrelevant, is forcefully shown by the abridgements of civil liberties which result when the economic privilege of elites is attacked. The "right to development," touted by African elites as a prerequisite to the more traditional human rights, may well be merely a cover for denial of those basic civil and political liberties which will allow the dispossessed masses to act in their own interests. To wait for economic development, including a "basic needs" oriented redistribution of wealth, to occur before allowing for civil and political liberties is to invite the possibility that such redistribution will never occur. Even in socialist societies, elites entrench and perpetuate themselves. Without human rights, the evidence suggests, economic growth may occur but economic development will not. "Full bellies" require political participation and civil liberties.
III. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE SOCIAL ORDER, AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
In the introduction to this paper I noted that the position that civil/political liberties can be left in abeyance until basic economic rights are secured is based on a view of human nature which assumes that the individual whose belly is not full has no interest in dignity, self-respect, or personal freedoms. I believe, rather, that while individuals need physical security (both physical integrity and economic subsistence), they also need a sense of social order and of belonging to that social order; that is, a sense of belonging expressed in their cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties to their community. Interestingly, those rights which would preserve the peoples' sense of belonging to a community, of having the self-respect which comes from fulfilling one's role in society, are guaranteed, in international law, not in the group rights over individual rights is to deny the reality that "strangers" or outsiders are now also part of large-scale, heterogeneous African nationstates; that individuals are increasingly mobile and alienated from their communal roots; and that, in complex modern cities, individuals need new sets of rights to protect them against large-scale, bureaucratic organizations, especially the organization of the state. The preservation of social/cultural rights of community, therefore, is not enough. Individual civil and political rights are also necessary. The large centralized state cannot operate on the same lines as the small community. While the latter is relatively homogeneous and unstratified, the former is ethnically heterogeneous and increasingly stratified along lines of wealth, education, and control of office. While it is true that, for the most part, the state has not engaged in the systematic destruction of local ethnic groups in Africa, it is also true that competition for the scarce modern goods of wealth, education, and office is conducted in Africa partly along ethnic lines. In some cases, as in Amin's Uganda, membership of particular religious groups is also important.65 The individual who is denied, for example, a university position because of his ethnicity needs to be able to demand his rights as an individual, even while his ethnic group as a collectivity is agitating for a new university in its own geographical region. Similarly, the changing social structure is resulting in new ideas about old roles. The individual woman worker needs to be able to demand equal pay for her equal work, even as her rural sister needs to be assured that her rights to land will not be abrogated by new legislation implementing individual land title, usually in men's names.66 All communal groups need means to defend themselves against encroaching power of the centralized state; each individual needs means to protect him/herself against violations of laws or discrimination in cases in which his/her original membership group is powerless, or unwilling, to act.
IV. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE NECESSARY IN AND OF THEMSELVES
In section II, I made the pragmatic argument that civil and political liberties will enhance the possibilities for economic development and equitable distribution of wealth. In this section I make a sociological argument, based All of these people risked their lives and their physical integrity (Martin Shikuku, for example, emerged from prison in 1978 unable to walk96), and sacrificed comfortable livelihoods as academics, lawyers, judges, or M.P.'s, in order to speak out about injustices which in fact did not affect them in a personally severe way. But moral integrity per se does not demand civil/political rights; perhaps, indeed, it can thrive in more heroic form when such rights are denied. What is important for our purposes is not the quality of the act nor the morality of the actor (Martin Shikuku, for instance, was also a strong supporter of Amin's expulsions of Asians 97). What is important is that people are willing to make sacrifices, both of their physical integrity and of their material security, for the sake of a cause in which they believe. Are such sacrifices, however, only made by members of the elite who, having been raised in relative security, are able to indulge in the relative luxury of critical thought?
The question cannot be answered by existing empirical data. Cantril's evidence suggests that ordinary Nigerians value family and personal development as well as outright material wealth, but even so, such evidence may suggest attachment to traditional communal values rather than individual freedoms. Is it likely that the non-elite will be motivated by the same political ideas as the elite? I suggest, following Barrington Moore, that it is.98 Without indulging in idealism, one can hypothesize that there is a universal belief in fairness and justice which permeates all societies. The content of what is fair may differ, but all societies have a rule of law and a system of legitimating authority. In large-scale, heterogeneous modern societies, an efficient means of guaranteeing that law is just and authority legitimate is to implement civil and political freedoms which protect the individual against abuse of law, and allow the individual effective participation in the choosing and operations of government. When non-elite Africans are confronted by the centralized modern state, they "need" the same sorts of protections to preserve their sense of justice and fairness as the elites "need." Their belief in fairness and legitimacy will result in demands for civil and political freedoms simultaneously with demands for economic development. Such freedoms cannot merely be put aside until all bellies are full.
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A HIERARCHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
A number of attempts have been made to establish a hierarchy of human rights or, alternately, a list of basic human rights which cannot be violated under any circumstances,99 as opposed to human rights which are of sec-ondary importance and which may be delayed until economic development occurs. In this section, I suggest not a hierarchy, but rather a categorization of different kinds of rights. This categorization will show that "basic needs" and hence basic "rights" (accepting that basic rights ought to be derived from basic needs) are both civil/political and economic/social/cultural in content; the separation of the two "kinds" of rights is a false distinction arising out of ideological and political disputes. 100 Firstly, it appears that there is a basic right to personal or physical integrity; in Shue Secondly, there are two kinds of "human dignity" rights which, I believe, any person living in a small-scale, communal, non-modern society would want, even if (hypothetically) such a person were unconcerned with '"Western" individual rights. The first is a right to an historically and culturally defined minimum absolute wealth; that is, to a fair share of the community's economic resources. Along with this there is the need for the "right of belonging" or the right to community; that is, the need to feel secure in one's kinship or social system and in one's exercise of custom, ritual, culture; the need to feel that those who have power have some legitimacy and are not arbitrary.0o6
Thirdly, there are two kinds of rights stressed in the Western political tradition but not confined to it: individual civil and political freedoms, and socialist equality. As Hodgkin 107 rightly points out, the Western political tradition includes socialism as well as liberal capitalism. The socialist ideal is that of relative, not absolute, wealth, and is grounded in the belief that inequalities of wealth should be eliminated. I believe that relative wealth is less important than absolute wealth. As Barrington Moore argues, people do not mind economic inequality, so long as they feel that they themselves are getting their fair share; that is, equity is more important to them than equality. 108 What is important, then, is to remember that the implicit hierarchy of human rights contained in the first paradigm of development noted in section II above may not be correct. The "full belly" may not always precede moral integrity, the right to community, or political freedom in the value system of an individual. Indeed, Bay goes so far as to assert that "many, perhaps most, human beings tend to be prepared for extremes of selfsacrifice for family, friends, comrades, or a cause."'4 There is no reason to think that ordinary Africans have less capacity for moral speculation than members of the African or Western elite, although they may have less capacity to articulate or act on their beliefs. As an anonymous participant in the 1966 Dakar seminar on human rights put it, 'To sacrifice the liberties inherent in the human personality in the name of economic development...
[is] to reduce the individual to the role of producer and consumer of goods, which . . [is] far too high a price to pay for improving the material conditions of existence." 1s
